Knowledge Economy and Information Society

Monday, February 26, 2007

Knowledge Economy and Information Society

Lecture 6: E-Business: Electronic Commerce and Business Communications

(5th March 2007) notes from Lawrence Green

Seminar question/exercise:

  1. What are the key issues that surround any decision (at firm level) to launch into Business to Business (B2B) e-commerce environments?

  1. What are the key issues that surround any decision (at firm level) to launch into Business to Consumer (B2C) e-commerce environments?

Think about company internal and external factors – key drivers, resources and finance, capabilities and skills, organisational issues, infrastructure, markets etc.

Resources:

  • EC European Competitiveness Report 2000 (Supplement on B2B e-commerce)
  • European e-business observatory at: http://www.ebusiness-watch.org/ (this is a particularly useful source for e-business related materials)
  • UK Government (PIU) (1999) ‘E-Commerce at its Best’ (available on-line)
  • CRIC publications available via: http://www.cric.ac.uk/cric/compprojects/e-commerce/Default.htm
  • Consultancy reports from a wide variety of agencies - many available on-line (Goldman Sachs, Forrester Research, Gartner, IDC etc.)
  • Web searches using the term ‘B2B e-commerce’ are likely to generate thousands of ‘hits’ relating to B2B strategy, solutions and benefits.
  • Wikipedia – the site has some useful entries concerning both B2B and B2C e-commerce
  • European Commission ‘Thematic Portal’ Information Society at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/ebusiness/index_en.htm

Further services references for seminar 5:

check out the OECD website for two essential guides to services:

Enhancing the Performance of the Services Sector

try the library the URL is - http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,2340,en_2649_37461_35026178_1_1_1_37461,00.html

and

STI Working Papers are available for free download at www.oecd.org/sti/working-pape

  • here see:
  • STI Working Paper 2005/3: The Service Economy in OECD Countries


Friday, February 23, 2007

TrendChart Innovation Policy In Europe

TrendChart Innovation Policy In Europe

here are some great studies of services and services innovation

SERVICES and Information Society / Knowledge Economy

This week's seminar will be in two main parts.
Part 1 will consider the nature and roles of services in "post-industrial society", will examine IT in services, etc.
Part 2 will look at Knowledge Intensive Business services: KIBS in particular.

  • What's special about services?
  • How can different types of services be understood?
  • Is service growth inexorable?
  • What do KIBS do for innovation?


Some references for part 1:
Good sites for information on services:
RESER: http://www.reser.net/
global services network http://www.globalservicesnetwork.com/ and from there member associations



Some references for part 2:

  • also available as three separate reports: The knowledge-intensive business services sector - what future?; Knowledge-intensive business services: Trends and scenarios; and Knowledge-intensive business services - policies, issues and the future at http://www.emcc.eurofound.eu.int/content/source/eu05016a.html
More to come! IM

Labels:

Monday, February 12, 2007

APOLOGIES for the persistent formatting problems that plague this blog.

I have hopefully corrected most of these now. I am working to correct the remainder, please tell me if you are having difficulties!

Ian

BTW, here is a useful set of links: http://members.aol.com/leshaddon/Links.html
prepared by Leslie Haddon (whose work is always worth following) which includes, among others:

Integer Programme – http://www.integerproject.co.uk/

UK project aimed at furthering the development of Intelligent and Green homes...

COST269 – http://www.cost269.org/

'User Aspects of ICTs' ... reports and papers including ones on mobility and ICTs, capabilities and ICTs, the extended human, cultural factors shaping ICT use and the process of collaboration when researching ICTs. The network also organised a conference in Helsinki in 2003 called ‘The Good, the Bad and the Irrelevant: The user and the future of information and communication technologies’ (Details at http://goodbad.uiah.fi - papers available from this site).

EMTEL - http://www.emtel2.org

The 'European Media Technology and Everyday Life’ network

HOIT - http://www.hoit.org

The Home Orientated informatics and Telematics network . For abstracts from the last conference, see http://crito.uci.edu/noah/abstracts1.htm

e-Living - www.living-digital.com

EC project from 2002-2004 involving a longitudinal survey of ICTs in Bulgaria, Germany, Israel, Italy, Norway and the UK. Reports from this work are downloadable.


SIGIS – http://www.rcss.ed.ac.uk/sigis

EC funded programme, looking at issues of gender and social inclusion. The reports from various projects are downloadable.

Sociological Institute, University of Zurichhttp://socio.ch/mobile/index_mobile.htm

This site has links to publications on the mobile phone and mobile computing and hosts some discussion groups in this field

SOCQUIT - www.socquit.net

EC funded programme looking at Social Capital in Europe and questions about how ICTs can increase our quality of life .

Designing the User - http://www.zigt.ze.tu-muenchen.de/users/

web-site of two German historians of technology which has the details of a network of people interested in the consumption of 20th Century technology .

Telenor publications - http://www.telenor.no/fou/program/nomadiske/artikler.shtml

This site contains Telenor’s research publications, including Richard Ling’s many papers, especially on mobile telephony. Many are in English and downloadable.

Richard Ling Home Page – http://richardling.com

prolific writer on the topic of mobile phones, amongst other things

Sociology of the Mobile Phone - http//socio.ch./mobile/index_mobile.htm

Swiss Site with links to various online texts worldwide, many of which concern the mobile in everyday life

Mobile phone/SMS/Instant Messaging Research - http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~nalink/mobile.html

Pew Internet and American Life Project - http://www.pewinternet.org/

downloadable reports that have analysed a US database on Internet use.

The HomeNet Project - http://homenet.cs.cmu.edu/progress/index/html

Centre for Communication Policy Internet Study, UCLA – http://ccp.ucla.edu/pages/internet-report.asp

This site has downloadable reports that have analysed a US database on Internet use.

Stanford Institute for the Quantitative study of Society (SIQSS) Internet and Society study – http://www.stanford.edu/group/siqss/

This site has a downloadable report that has analysed a US database on Internet use.

Barry Wellam Homepage - http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~wellman

work on social networks and computer networks/the Internet as well as on other topics such as the Digital Divide.

NOAH project - http://www.crito.uci.edu/noah/publications.htm

'National Outlook for Automation in the Home' project

Resource Centre for Cybercultural Studies – http//www.comwashington.edu/rccs

Silicon Valley Culture Project - http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/anthropology/svcp/index.html

ethnographic studies in the cultures living and working in the hi-tech communities of Silicon Valley.

Sunday, February 11, 2007

Seminar 4: Success and Failure in IT innovations

Can you think of real failures in IT innovcation? By this i do not mean a particular firm's failures to capture a market, or set a standard. I want you to think about products that have been spectacularly uncussuccessful, so that the whole idea of the project seems to have been dropped - or the project comes to be seen as a niche commodity rather tha one for the mass market it was originally aimed at.

Bring your own examples!

In the seminar I will be focusing on VIDEOTEX in particular, and I suggest that as well as checking this out on Wikipedia, etc., you look at my old paper on this topic
V Schneider, J-M Charon, I Miles, G Thomas, T Vedel, 1991
The Dynamics of Videotex Development in Britain, France and Germany: a cross-national comparison European Journal of Communication vol 6 no 2 pp 187-212
(access via the library website)


- also the 1990 book:
G Thomas and I Miles 1990 Telematics in Transition: the emergence of new interactive services Harlow: Longmans


meanwhile, here are some excerpts from an essay on the theme with Graham Thomas (who wrote an interesting book on audiotex, called Cash Lines. The essay was

I Miles & G Thomas, 1995, "User Resistance to New Interactive Media: participants, processes and paradigms" in M Bauer (ed) Resistance to New Technology Cambridge, Cambridge University Press


"National differences are strikingly apparent in the development and diffusion of many communications media, perhaps more because of the monopolistic role of national PTOs than because of cultural differences. Videotex has already been mentioned several times, and form a particularly interesting example of the difficulties associated with developing interactive products for consumers, as well as the variety of national paths in consumer IT use.

Prestel is now often written off as a great IT disaster, but its experience is highly instructive. Like the PC, originators saw it as providing the general public with access to the computer power previously exclusively available to large organisations. It would provide public access to mainframe computers and their databases, by combining two familiar domestic technologies, television and the telephone. The modes of presentation were intended to appeal to nonprofessionals, being easy to learn and attractive in layout. The output would be relatively large text characters and simple but colourful graphics, laid out in attractive pages on the TV screen, which one navigated via simple menus. A small and very basic keypad would be the tool for consumers to input uncomplicated requests for action in terms of these menus, and thus the design anticipated that data transfer from the videotex system needed to be rapid, while that from the consumer could be slow.

The small early Prestel keypads made it difficult for users to input more than a few symbols at a time; but with the emergence of home computers, by the early 1980s, many potential consumers were using far more sophisticated devices. The Prestel design underestimated the scope for cheap processing power in the home provided by progress in microelectronics, and while few people had forecast the creation and popularity of home computers, this may also reflect the public service provider mentality then prevalent in the PTO. That is, processing power was assumed to be concentrated in the service provider's mainframes, not distributed around the system. Home computer pioneers wanted to provide mass information-processing capabilities through powerful microprocessors and software, the network operators thought more of opening up access to centralised information resources. It was assumed that consumers would use domestic TV sets, tie up their phone lines, and spend time with cumbersome menus to locate data - which turned out to be of very uneven quality. Information providers were inexperienced with producing material in user-friendly and attractive ways, and often seem to have been half-hearted in their commitment to the new service; the PTO was more concerned with establishing the technically advanced system by extending its services to reach as many potential users as possible quickly, than with seriously assessing consumer demand and the adequacy of information providers. Finally, 'gateways' to real-time transactional services such as teleshopping were slow to materialise.

Prestel was an effort to establish a framework for consumer interactivity with a new computer medium, in the absence of much prior experience - the design was evolved before the 1980s introduced not only home computers, but also videorecorders, CD players, infrared remote controllers, and related IT-based products into large numbers of households. Also, the building-block household technologies of telephone and TV were ones where elaborate infrastructures deliver information products to their final users. In the 1970s these were thought of as public utilities, with a mission to provide collective services - and the telecommunication and broadcasting authorities were supposed to know what was best for consumers.

Prestel revealed that authority was not authoritative on what would appeal to consumers. Forecasts of millions of family users rapidly evaporated as, despite advertising campaigns and public displays, considerable uncertainty and little enthusiasm had be generated as to the new service's functionality. After more than a decade of searching for elusive consumer markets, the major remaining consumer services ( mainly oriented to computer hobbyists, the only consumer market niche to be established) were withdrawn in late 1991. Prestel remains as a business service, catering to certain industries (travel, insurance, the motor trade) where videotex allows relatively untrained staff to access information on flight availability or insurance rates, and to book seats or order components; and many businesses have abandoned Prestel itself, using proprietary videotex systems set up by major companies in their sectors.

With Prestel's failure as a consumer medium major elements of its design fell. The role of the TV as part of the package has all but disappeared, to be replaced by the computer screen or dedicated terminal; more sophisticated keyboards have been introduced for user inputs; and faster communications in both directions are now standard. Similar trajectories were apparent within the consumer market, where computer hobbyists would typically purchase a modem and appropriate software, and interface their home computers to Prestel via the telephone network. But videotex-like design features did prove successful in the case of teletext, where 'pages' are accessed via a TV set and using a small remote control keypad. Like Prestel, teletext use required consumers to acquire new TV sets, though it did not involve fitting new telephone sockets or paying for telephone network use, let alone paying subscription charges (other than the regular TV license) or access charges for particularly interesting pages. Teletext information might be basic, but it was free: it contained TV listings, so it was convenient to access via the TV set without lengthy interruption of a regular broadcast. Its limited interactivity (though see the discussion above) meant that a sophisticated remote controller (also becoming popular at about the same time) could be used rather than a complex keyboard.

The great success in consumer videotex services , whose experience is often contrasted with that of Prestel, is, of course, the French Minitel system. In establishing its design, the French PTO paid substantial attention to experiment and interaction with users, whereas Prestel's innovators assumed that they could anticipate the design criteria for interactive services. (Recall that in the 1970s the British PTO could define even the colour and style of telephones, and had little experience of consumers who could opt for alternatives. A dramatically more competitive environment , surrounds interactive products of all sorts as we reach the end of the twentieth century.) While sharing many features of videotex design, Minitel differed in significant ways from Prestel. Online search was facilitated by keyword search rather than by progression through menus. There was no subscription charge, and in addition the cost structure was far more transparent. Gateways to service operatives allowed for teleshopping and related applications from the outset - indeed, the French PTO encouraged service providers to hook up to its network, whereas the British PTO had sought to control the facilities by running them on its own host computers. (This might have served to ensure quality control, but this did not prove to be the case.) The French PTO distributed, free of charge, a standard simple computer-type terminal with an alphanumeric keyboard and built-in VDU. Users were motivated to gain experience: rather than assume that people would be motivated to invest money - and time - in searching for large volumes of online information, an important information resource ( the telephone directory) was shifted to the new medium.

As is well known, messaging, rather than database access proved to be the major consumer application of Minitel - a facility designed in after it emerged as surprisingly important in pilot studies. A large number of 'messagerie' services were established, with the notable successes being those which allowed anonymous communication on erotic topics. So what emerged was not a large consumer market for interactivity with online databases, but one for new forms of interpersonal communication. The messaging facilities were rather primitive, being based around exchange of simple text: but individuals could adopt new personae and pseudonyms, even changing their apparent gender if they wished; they could rapidly make contact with other individuals with little of the awkwardness and risk of embarrassment familiar in traditional meeting-places. With a critical mass of terminal users established by the free distribution of terminals, other users could be located at any time of day or night, and even infrequently used information services could often generate enough revenue to remain viable.

This use of messagerie in France attracted considerable attention and some censure, but the service has remained popular despite controversy. In the UK, however, before Prestel was written off as a consumer service, the PTO had gone to some lengths to restrict similar uses of messaging facilities. Chatline systems were withdrawn, to the annoyance of many users; and the possibility of such services proving dominant was among the factors cited in the BT thinking which finally ruled out the notion of following the French in subsidised distribution of terminals. However, the sources of concern here seem to have followed more from the experience of voice chatlines on conventional telephones, rather than from particular problems generated in computer media. Let us briefly examine some of the new voice-based services involved here. We refer to these as audiotex services (here we are discussing what are also known as Premium-Rate Services, although some definitions of audiotex include freephone services and some other kinds of computer-enhanced telephony).

Audiotex services have proved extremely successful in the UK - in terms of market growth, though they have not been popular in all quarters. This success can be directly counterposed to the reasons for the failure of Prestel (and to some extent the success of Minitel). Firstly, with audiotex there was no chicken-and-egg problem to be solved relating to the supply of terminals and the number and quality of new services - nearly all households already possessed the necessary terminal for the reception of audiotex services, in the form of the normal telephone handset.

In contrast to Prestel, audiotex was introduced without any huge publicity fanfare. The overlay network used for audiotex premium-rate services was originally developed to supply freephone services, and from the beginning independent service providers were allowed to use their own equipment and to develop their own service formats. In terms of user expenses, audiotex uses, essentially, the 'kiosque' billing system which proved so popular in France with Minitel users, with no subscription required and the cost of the services being based simply on the time the call is in session and the time of day (peak or off-peak) that the call is made. Audiotex services are billed as part of normal telephone bills, with the revenue being shared by the network operator and the service provider. This billing system has some weaknesses - for instance, itemised billing for telephone services is not universally available and even in areas where itemised billing is offered BT excludes calls costing under approximately 50p . Another 'weakness', which has helped create both acceptance (use) of, and resistance to, audiotex is the problem of whether the user is actually the subscriber paying the bill.

Undoubtedly, a major factor in the initial popularity of audiotex was the possibility of trying out the new services at someone else's expense, whether that be children using their parents' telephone to call chatlines or employees using their workplace phones to listen to sports results, horoscopes or sex lines. When the first bills eventually arrived, their size contributed to a general outcry about the pernicious effects of audiotex. This aspect of the system design has led to substantial restrictions being placed upon audiotex services..."

Seminar 3 - some further reading:
this essay, below, may be interesting for those of you who have been inspired to find out more about the early history of computing.
"Machinery Has Been Taught Poetry Instead of Arithmetic": Babbage and the Division of Mental and Manual Labour
Ian Miles
- revised April 2000, originally prepared in 1989 -

This essay seeks to bring to wider attention a very interesting but neglected study in the early history of Information Technology. I also want to make some points about the relation between technology, markets, and rhetoric. The essay was originally prepared in response to a paper by Bruce Berman entitled "The Computer Metaphor", published in Science as Culture no 7 (1989); however I never got around to publishing it at that time, because of getting caught up in the move from SPRU to PREST. I have revised it slightly, and knocked out the footnotes (which HTML publishing via Word seems to lose).


I had met Bruce in the mid-1980s, when he was visiting SPRU (where I was then based). Bruce drew my attention to the remarkable fact that Charles Babbage is known both as an early theorist of both the division of labour in manufacturing and as a pioneer in the development of the computer. In Sweden in 1989, where I was kindly accommodated at Linköping University, I was able to satisfy some of the curiosity this had aroused, both by inspecting a Babbage difference engine at the Stockholm Technical Museum, and by reading some texts that cast light on the relation between these two achievements.

Two conclusions emerged from these investigations. First, Bruce Berman may inadvertently give a slightly misleading impression of the relation between Babbage's work on the division of mental and manual labour. Babbage did not develop the idea of programmable computing from his studies of the division of labour in manufacturing, as might be concluded from the quotation Bruce uses. If anything, the causal sequence is the opposite of this, surprising as it might seem (at first sight) to materialists.

Second, the failure of Babbage's enterprise was a complex and probably inevitable affair: It was not merely technical problems that hindered the development of Victorian computing. Rather, like some computers of more recent provenance, it appears that

Babbage's machine was a solution in search of a problem. The Difference Engine was actually built, though this history has been neglected. While technical problems rendered it rather less effective than its designers had hoped, the more serious problems were a lack of markets for automated forms of mental labour (of specific sorts of mental labour, to be precise) at that point in history.

  • The Origins of Babbage's Project

Babbage's On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (I will cite from the 1835 edition) is a milestone text on the division of labour. In the preface Babbage provides an account of the origins of this book:

"one of the consequences that have resulted from the Calculating Engine, the construction of which I have been so long superintending. Having been induced, during the last ten years, to visit a considerable number of workshops and factories, both in England and on the Continent, for the purposes of endeavouring to make myself acquainted with the various resources of mechanical art, I was insensibly led to apply to them those principles of generalisation to which my other pursuits had naturally given rise.....Several of the principles which I have proposed, appear to me to have been unnoticed before...particularly...the explanation I have given of the division of labour." (no pagination in the Preface.)

Babbage thus himself claims that he was driven to study (and then to enunciate his conclusions about) the division of manual labour by needing to understand manufacturing processes. He claims, furthermore, that this necessity was imposed by his desire to construct a computer.

He calls this computer the Calculating Engine - or Difference Engine, referring to its mode of operation, and to distinguish it from the later invention of the Analytical Engine. The word "computer" was at the time used for the clerical occupation of calculation, and Babbage speculates that human "computers" will be displaced by technology:

"when the completion of a calculating engine shall have produced a substitute for the whole of the third section of computers, the attention of analysts will naturally be directed to simplifying its application, by a discussion of the methods of converting analytical formulae into numbers" (p195).

In this book, explaining the operation of the Calculating Engine, Babbage draws analogies between it and the division of labour in material manufacturing, comparing formulae to

machines(!). But this an expositional device: while it is quite likely that his study of manufacturing division of labour had some influence upon the analysis of the mental division of labour, and the mechanisation of certain parts of intellectual work, the evidence is strong that his account in the preface is correct. In other words, the theorist of the division of manual labour was born out of the would-be divider of mental labour. Babbage already had conceptualised the division of intellectual labour before he went on to study manual labour.

This would seem to reverse a standard materialist precept, in which consciousness is supposed to follow social action, not vice versa. Closer inspection resolves the paradox. Babbage's analysis of the manual division of labour was a theorisation of what was already happening in workshops. But in supporting this materialist approach, we cannot deny that consciousness certainly can inform social action. Indeed, Babbage’s ideas did have an impact upon subsequent manufacturing practice.

Furthermore, his conceptualisation of the division of intellectual labour was also founded on earlier practice. And it too had an impact on subsequent social action, as we shall see – if not the impact he expected in the quotation above.

Well before Babbage had begun his studies, people had been wrestling with the problems of simplifying complex computations (required for engineering, navigation, etc.) Babbage describes in Chapter XX one French effort that resulted in the production of 17 large folio volumes of mathematical tables (the Tables of Cladastres). This involved new methods for the production of such tables, involving a detailed division of labour between:

  1. 5 or 6 eminent mathematicians, whose job was to select among alternative analytical expressions of functions, choosing those most easily adaptable to a high division of labour in their calculation (incidentally, this involved a form of human parallel processing!);
  2. 7 people of high mathematical knowledge who would convert these formulae into numbers - a big job - and verify the calculations by "certain means" other than checking them all;
  3. 60 to 80 calculators, who used only simple addition and subtraction to calculate interim and final results.

Thus it appears that the division of both mental and manual labour in practice led Babbage first to theorise the former - and then, as a result of his efforts to mechanise the former, to theorise the latter. No doubt history was vastly complex than this summary account suggests. For example, there were calculating machines before Babbage's Engine, and it requires detailed study to specify what was new in his device, and to identify (as far as possible) where the notions came from. In Stockholm's Technical Museum, the Difference Engine was (in 1989 anyway) situated in the same room as earlier calculating machines and later electronic computers, suggesting a long (if often interrupted) tradition of work. Also in the room is a picture of the design for Babbage's later, unbuilt Analytical Engine - which was a far more radical proposal, much more like the modern programmable computer. This involved separate units carrying out arithmetic, data storage, and data output (printing), and using punch cards for programming. The Analytical Engine’s design is displayed alongside a Jacquard Loom. This makes the genealogy of Babbage’s notions of programs clear. Not only were punch cards used in the loom, but Babbage also labelled of part of the Engine as the "mill".


Babbage drew explicit analogies between the automation of, and division of labour in, "mechanical and mental operations". The division of labour in both cases:
"enables us to purchase and apply to each process precisely that quantity of skill and knowledge which is required for it."(p201)

Interestingly, he goes on to rephrase Smith's well-known comment about the division of labour being limited by the size of the market: "division of labour cannot be successfully applied unless there exists a great demand for its produce; and it requires a large capital to be employed in those arts in which it is used."(p201) This statement throws a great deal of light onto what was to become the fate of the Difference Engine in practice.


Babbage's book is well worth reading, not least because of its futurological elements, and the author's unembarassed statement of his ideology. (It also contains a splenetic early
account of the "British Disease", as he complains about the Presidency of the Royal Society being taken by a member of the aristocracy rather than by a member of the "nobility of science"; and a discussion of energy crises!)


Babbage sees science as key to technical progress, and mathematics as the ultimate science:

"the further we advance from the origin of our knowledge, the larger it becomes, and the greater power it bestows upon its cultivators, to add new fields to its domains. Yet...the whole, already gained, bears a constantly diminishing ratio to that which is contained within the still more rapidly expanding horizon of our knowledge... another and a higher science, itself still more boundless, is also advancing with a giant's stride, and having grasped the mightier masses of the universe, and reduced their wanderings to laws, has given us in its own condensed language, expressions, which are to the past as history, to the future as prophecy. It is the same science which is now preparing its fetters for the minutest atoms which nature has created.... It is the science of...calculation which becomes continually more necessary at each step of our progress, and which must ultimately govern the whole of the applications of science to the arts of life." (pp387-8)4


These laws of mathematics must have been designed, according to Babbage, who sees this as evidence of a creator: in a manner resonant of some recent commentators, for example Rudy Rucker, the Universe is seen as a vast programmed system.

  • The Difference Engine in Practice

Before my Swedish trip I had not realised that several working versions of the Difference Engine were actually constructed. Indeed, I had fallen for the line later recycled when the Science Museum displayed their model of the Engine, that Babbage’s device had not previously been constructed till their effort. However, in Sweden, I was lucky enough not only to see one, but also to come upon a rich account of their development. Unfortunately this study is not as well known as it deserves to be.

Michael Lindgren's (1987) book Glory and Failure provides a fascinating account of Babbage's work, of the people that created more-or-less viable products out of it, and of the fate of these products in the Victorian market. The book contains discussions of many

themes, but here I concentrate on points concerning the origins and fate of the Difference Engine. (Page references from here on are to this book.)

Lindgren notes that Babbage was a collector of tables, with a longstanding interest in the topic (he had visited Paris in the 1810s and '20s and seen The Tables de Cadastres there5). He also had a practical concern with generating them - in 1824 he had prepared mortality tables while helping to found a life insurance company. In 1822 Babbage was arguing that the progress of science would be retarded by "the accumulating labour which arises from the arithmetical applications of mathematical formulae"(p44) Whether this was a motivating factor in the development of the Difference Engine, or a marketing rationalisation is not clear.

Babbage was already working on the initial idea in 1821, and by 1822 a rough prototype had been constructed. One question that will strike the modern reader concerns why
the name "Difference Engine" was chosen. "Difference" comes from the calculation procedures followed: the method of differences. But it was unusual at the time to find "engine" applied to machinery, notes Lindgren, and it was new to apply it to calculating machinery. Hoiwever, the use of the term "steam engine" was widespread, and a technological revolution was underway through the use of steam power at the time Babbage was writing. Babbage had envisaged the Difference Engine being steam-powered. The steam power would not only drive the calculating unit, but also a printing unit, achieving mechanised typesetting of the tables, so they could be reproduced reliably. Lindgren comments that this latter feature was in many respects the most radical aspect of the Engine: at that time newspapers were being printed by steam, but not set. However, Lindgren (pp39-41) also plausibly suggests that Babbage was hoping that the term would highlight the technologically revolutionary implications of his idea. Parallels with present-day "hyping" of products are readily apparent.

Babbage had some success in promoting his idea: in 1823 the Astronomical Society (a body with interest in calculation of planetary tables, etc.) awarded him a medal for invention, and the British government donated £1500 towards the costs of building a working model. Another £1500 was stumped up in 1829, and Lindgren estimates the total cost to the government as some £17,000 in the end: a considerable amount of money for the time.

But Babbage failed to deliver the goods. Much of Lindgren's study is concerned with delineating the reasons for this. These reasons include Babbage's perfectionism (the best illustration of which is his almost fanatical self-imposed research project studying the readability of different coloured inks on different coloured papers, with a huge range of unlikely and implausible combinations!), his underestimation of expenses, intervening illnesses, personality clashes with his (also perfectionist and expensive) engineer, repeated modifications of the design, and so on. It was actually in the course of trying to get workshops to meet his exacting standards that Babbage was driven to study the division of manual labour.

By 1833 only one section of the Engine was completed, less than one seventh of the total unit, and of little practical use by itself. The printing unit was never constructed. Babbage

halted work in 1834, turning his attention to the Analytical Engine. And this is where the story usually ends: the failure of the Difference Engine was a technical or personality problem. If it could have been constructed, the implication goes, it would have found wide application. This theme is pursued in a highly interesting and well-informed alternate-history novel, The Difference Engine by William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, pioneers of the "cyberpunk" genre of science fiction. This book explores the implications of an IT revolution happening simultaneously with the industrial revolution. For my review of this – and why its founding assumptions are shown by Lindgren’s work to be wrong, see Miles (1991.)

Lindgren documents that a Swedish teenager actually did construct Difference Engines (including the one that I saw). He shows, too, that they proved practically impossible to commercialise.

Georg Scheutz was a Swedish innovator - a great deal of his work was a matter of technology transfer and diffusion. Much of his writing also finds curiously echoes in the 1990s, although he castigates Sweden for things which are now more commonly described as flaws of the British. Thus in 1834 he noted that Sweden lacks:

"the known talent of bringing...goods to the market, which the foreigner usually possesses to a high degree and which we...almost despise" (p91).

Scheutz described Britain in terms now reserved for Japan: there was :

"in England a special class of industrialists, who made their money from other people's inventions...tirelessly read foreign journals, reports, etc... special agents who studied the patent offices and workshops in foreign countries" (p134).

This made him think twice about patenting in the UK, even though he saw more chances for diffusing new products in the UK than in Sweden. Scheutz shared with Babbage an interest in mathematical tables and calculating machines. An avid reader, he encountered

Babbage's writings on the Difference Engine. Concluding that there were flaws in Babbage's design, he interested his son Edvard in the project - and Edvard eventually produced a hand-driven Difference Engine cheaply, initially as a hobby, at home. Does this remind you of the garage computer industry of California in the 1960s?

The first machine was completed in 1843. It was smaller and lighter than Babbage's machine, and embodied solutions to some printing problems that Babbage had floundered on. A second machine was finished in 1853: this one was built in a modern factory workshop and incorporated some new features: the Scheutz's were hoping to commercialise their achievement. A third Engine was completed in 1859. Lindgren describes a long catalogue of efforts by the Scheutzs, with considerable support from Babbage, to market the Difference Engine. It was patented in the UK, exhibited in London and Paris.

What was the market for a Difference Engine? Georg Scheutz himself suggested in 1833 that:

"even if the larger and more complete engine should later on remain the only example of its kind, it would suffice for the needs of the whole world". (p272)

In other words, all the needed tables could be produced by one machine and sold in bulk. This sounds very reminiscent of suggestions made in the early days of electronic computers that probably one or two would suffice for all the computing requirements of a country; and these requirements were naturally more numerous and varied than those envisaged for the difference engine. But later, he was won to the idea of a small and portable machine, and in 1857 wrote to a mailing list of 400 arguing that the Engine would be:

"a necessity wherever there is an observatory, a university, or a press dealing with mathematical works... it will not take so many years for this to be the case" (p209).

Lindgren's analysis suggests that the earlier judgement was the more accurate - and that, since the needed tables had already largely been calculated to the number of digits which were the limit of the machine, the outlook was even less promising. (Still, there was the matter - which Babbage considered rather important - of avoiding the introduction of new errors in the reprinting of tables.)

The second Engine was eventually sold in 1857 for much less than hoped, to an observatory in Albany, USA. It was never used beyond its first trials, for a combination of reasons. These seemingly include Scheutz's refusal to release details of the operation to them, in order to guard his intellectual property. The result was that tables were produced, but never published.

The manufacture of the third engine was, after long efforts, supported by Britain's

General Register Office: the agreement was made in 1857 and the Engine completed in 1859. Life Tables were published from this Engine's work. But its UK manufacturer made financial losses on the project. Worse, the Engine misbehaved after delivery, and required costly maintenance. Its use was eventually abandoned.

Lindgren shows that the conventional account is misleading. Certainly Babbage failed to produce his Difference Engine, but this was not because it was technically too difficult. (Even the Analytical Engine might have been completed.) Indeed, it was possible for a gifted teenager to successfully produce this early, hand-driven computer. The final product was cumbersome and rather unreliable - but so are first versions of most innovations. More importantly, there was not the market for computers which might have provided the economies of scale in manufacture, and focused more engineering attention on the problems of the device, so as to overcome the problems that users did confront.

The forms of mental labour which the Difference Engine challenged were specialised ones, with limited users. It might be further argued that the development of firms, corporations, and government agencies was not yet of a form which dictated the application of more general-purpose computer power. Beniger’s The Control Revolution makes good reading on this issue.

  • Conclusions

Many themes could be extracted from the early history of the Difference Engine. It could be read, for instance, in terms of an innovation research framework: supply-side enthusiasm taking precedence over proper analysis of user requirements, for

instance. It could be read in terms of the evolving nature of demand for arithmetical calculations and mental labour of related types, and related to the changing nature of the so-called "information economy". The story of Babbage himself is often told in terms of a classical scientific hero-figure (or in more demonological terms in a left-wing version, perhaps), but it too can be reworked in terms of a treatment of science as culture.

Despite considerable change in the social role of science and technology, Babbage's tireless promotion technical solutions (the Difference Engine) to economic and organisational problems, and his willingness to make claims for his invention that far

exceeded its actual achievements, bears a dramatic similarity to certain more recent technological developments - for instance nuclear power and weapons (consider Walter Marshall and Edward Teller). Even the way in which he deploys arguments about the

fundamental role of mathematics, to bolster his invention, is echoed in, for instance, the rhetoric about unlocking the power of the basic building blocks of matter. The symbolic and practical dimensions of science and technology appear to be inextricably intertwined, at least when it comes to forging support for new products and programmes.

  • Bibliography

Charles Babbage, 1835 edition, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (4th ed) London, Charles Knight; 1986 reprint by Augustus M Kelley, Fairfield NJ

James Beniger, 1986, The Control Revolution Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press

Bruce Berman, 1989, "The Computer Metaphor: Bureaucratizing the Mind" Science as Culture no 7 pp 7-42

Michael Lindgren, 1987, Glory and Failure: the difference engines of Johan Muller, Charles Babbage and Georg and Edvard Scheutz Linkoping Studies in Arts and Sciences,9 Stockholm Papers in History and Philosophy of Technology, 2017 ISBN91 7870 146 5 ISSN0282 9800

Ian Miles, 1991 "Past Tense, Futures Imperfect?"(review of William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, The Difference Engine) Futures vol 23 no 5 pp552-555


Seminar 3:

Building on - and taking issue with the perspectives in Week 2 - Jonathan Aylen will be presenting a lecture on
Computers and the early Information Society
and then leading the discussion that this sparks!

The powerpoints will be made available, and a number of references provided beyond these useful resources (here are the links for books on Amazon):
The Victorian Internet by Tom Standage
see http://tomstandage.com/vicnet.html

A Computer Called LEO: Lyons Tea Shops and the World's First Office Computer by Georgina Ferry
here's an accessible account http://www.csrc.lse.ac.uk/LEO/archive/caminer.pdf - I suspect there is also a BBC radio talk or programme by Georgina Ferry, I recall hearing this a few years ago: this may be it http://www.usabilityviews.com/uv005591.html

The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society by James R. Beniger


Jonathan has now provided the following input for this very interesting session:

Computers and the Early Information Society

In an earlier session, Professor Miles suggested there are stages in the evolution of an information technology society. This session focuses on a corner of that evolution, the early emergence of computer hardware, computer software and the early spread of computer use and its impact.

Social Shaping versus the Technical Approach to Computer History

The Role of SAGE



At one stage, the project trained half of the software programmers in America.

SAGE – the Semi Automatic Ground Environment air defence system – is credited with transforming the US computer industry with a sequence of hardware, software and communication innovations and catapulting IBM into manufacturing leadership in the computer sector. Key computing innovations were spawned by demands of this giant project, ranging from magnetic core memories to time-sharing. SAGE is also credited with introducing a systems approach to the management of large projects. At one stage, the project trained half of the software programmers in America.

Whether SAGE was “one of the major human accomplishments of the twentieth century” (Redmond and Smith, p.429) is open to debate. But it is clear that computer development in the US was shaped by the cold-war agenda.

Here we have a controversy. Some argue that the whole of computer development was shaped by the needs and rhetoric of the cold war:


Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, London: MIT Press, 1996


Others see the computer as a technical trajectory which moved forward in the face of user needs.

Kent G. Redmond and Thomas M. Smith, From Whirlwind to Mitre: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense Computer, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000


This by no means exhausts the reading on SAGE!

Automation in Industry

A similar approach dominates the controversy over the development of process control, contrast the following two accounts discussing essentially the same issue, how automation spread through manufacturing industry:


David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation, New York, OUP, 1986. This argues “technological developments are mediated by social power and domination, by irrational fantasies of omnipotence, by legitimating notions of progress and by the contradictions rooted in the technological projects themselves”(p.324.)


Jonathan Aylen, "Megabytes for Metals – The development of computer applications in the iron and steel industry", Ironmaking and Steelmaking, vol. 31, issue 6, December 2004, pp.465-478 – also featured on http://www.maney.co.uk/files/samplepages/Iron_Steel_article.pdf [UK] and http://www.smecc.org/ge_process_control.htm [USA] websites. Essentially treats the same process as the enthusiastic response of engineers struggling to improve the technical performance of equipment they managed, with innovation champions playing a key role.


The Application of Computers

Again on office and retail computing, Haigh and Cortada stress the importance of continuity, the significance of managerial issues and the slow evolution of technology in the workplace:


Thomas Haigh, “The Chromium-plated tabulator: Institutionalizing an electronic revolution, 1954-58, IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 2001, pp.75-104


James W. Cortada, The Digital Hand, How Computers Changed the Work of American Manufacturing, Transportation and Retail Industries, Oxford University Press, 2004. Good on the basic theme, weak on detail. Exclusively US focus.

Paul David (1990), “The dynamo and the computer: an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox”, American Economic Review, vol.80, Conference issue, May, pp.355-361


Hardware Development

Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Routledge, 3rd edition, 1997 (chapter 7, a brief treatment of computer hardware and electronics with an unduly strong emphasis on IBM.)


http://www.thocp.net/index.htm partial coverage but accessible


http://www.leo-computers.org.uk/pageone.htm great fun and a fascinating story!

Software Development

Software development is a neglected aspect of computer history.

Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software Industry, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2004


http://www.levenez.com/lang neglects early Manchester and US contributions


http://www.99-bottles-of-beer.net/ this really is the correct URL, you’ll soon get the idea !


http://people.ku.edu/~nkinners/LangList/Extras/langlist.htm

. . . and the truly remarkable

David Alan Grier, When Computers Were Human, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005 (Shows how the systematic application of large scale calculation to scientific problems started long before scientific computers.)

B. Jack Copeland, Colossus: The Secrets of Bletchley Park’s Codebreaking Computers, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006 (more accurate than earlier versions of this story. Shows how investment in science and technology can pay off with spectacular effect.)


Simon Lavington, The Pegasus Story: A history of a vintage British computer, London: Science Museum, 2000 (a succinct story of a widely used, Manchester built, 1950’s mainframe computer.)

Bedside Reading

Georgina Ferry, A Computer Called Leo: Lyons Teashops and the World’s First Office Computer, London: Fourth Estate, 2003

Jonathan Aylen

February 2007.